expected to be from lower expenditures on institutional care, since the cost of housing and informal care is shifted back to families.
Home and community-based waivers, by design, carry substantial incentives for careful selection of enrollees. In order to have an approved home and community-based waiver, states must select individuals ''at risk'' of institutionalization and must abide by a cost-neutrality provision, which mandates that total Medicaid plus-waiver expenditures for participants placed in the community not exceed expected Medicaid spending on institutional care. States put these provisions into operation in a variety of ways (Fried et al. 2000) . People can be selected for enrollment in a limited number of program slots based on actual institutional use or perceived at-risk status. To maintain cost neutrality, states can hold either individuals or groups to these levels of spending. This gives states substantial incentive to select people based on expected spending levels.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of a home and community-based waiver in North Carolina for adults with disabilities on a variety of cost measures. While the primary purpose of waiver programs is to provide care for individuals in the community rather than in an institution, examining the cost of waiver programs is important for two reasons. First, as states search for ways to reduce Medicaid expenditures to ease state budget deficits, waiver programs have been scaled back or have faced enrollment freezes in recent years (Holahan et al. 2004 ) despite being held up by the courts as a successful mechanism for providing deinstitutionalized care. Second, while states have observed cost savings from waiver programs, they have not distinguished between cost savings from careful selection of enrollees and true cost savings due to more cost-effective care for disabled adults.
We first explore the selection effects of program participation, also noted by Anderson and Mitchell (1997, 2000) in the context of an AIDS Medicaid waiver. In this work, we expand upon the Anderson and Mitchell analyses by examining the use of a Medicaid waiver in a more heterogeneous population, and by using a multilevel severity adjuster designed specifically for the disabled adult population. This measure allows us to examine the effect of varying degrees of severity within a large number of disability categories. We also explicitly model the effects of the length of time on the waiver on Medicaid expenditures in three areas: total Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid expenditures on nursing home care, and Medicaid expenditures on inpatient hospital care. Adjusting for length of time on the waiver more precisely measures the program effects on cost savings than does a discrete participation measure.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of a Medicaid waiver on expenditures for services for disabled adults. Waiver programs for disabled adults operate in 47 states and serve the majority of all waiver populations nationwide-56% of all recipients in 1999 (Kitchener and Harrington 2001) . In general, lengths of disability for most disabled adults are very long. This means that there are huge time horizons over which to use home services or nursing home services; consequently, there are significant quality of life and cost concerns when considering disabled adults over other populations.
Background
The Community Alternatives Program for Disabled Adults (CAP-DA) is the largest Medicaid home and community-based waiver program in North Carolina, and served approximately 12,243 people in fiscal year 2000. Frail elderly as well as disabled and blind adults are served by CAP-DA. Other waiver programs in the state assist mentally retarded and developmentally disabled individuals (around 4,000), medically fragile children (around 200), and AIDS/HIV patients (around 40) (DMA 2001) .
The CAP-DA program operates in all 100 counties in the state. The program is run by diverse types of lead agencies, such as local health departments, county hospitals, local agencies for the aged or local offices of the Department of Social Services. Each county has discretion as to how to operate the program, and may market the program differently. Eight basic services are available in all counties to CAP-DA recipients: 1) case management; 2) adult day health care; 3) supplies, such as nutritional supplements or medication dispensing boxes; 4) home mobility aids, such as wheelchair ramps and grab bars; 5) respite care, which can be both in-home and institutional; 6) home-delivered meals; 7) in-home aide services; and 8) telephone alert systems (DMA 2003) .
North Carolina's implementation of the waiver program for disabled adults uses two different institutional levels to define the eligible population: Medicaid enrollees are eligible if they are certified by their physicians to be at risk for care in either a skilled nursing facility (SNF) or an intermediate care facility (ICF). An ICF is a nursing home licensed by the state to provide health care to people who do not require skilled nursing care but need more than room and board. These two levels of care have different expected spending levels that are used for the budget-neutrality requirement. The monthly cap on expenditures during fiscal year 2000 was $3,360 for skilled nursing facilities, and $2,553 for intermediate care facilities (discussion with Kate Walton, DMA 2003) . This translates roughly to about $40,000 annually for SNF care and just over $30,000 for ICF care. County lead agencies have discretion about disenrollment of people who exceed the maximum, although in actuality few people exceed their maximum amount in a given month and if they do the lead agencies encourage them to reduce costs in subsequent months so that they do not meet the maximum over the full year (discussion with Mary Jo Littlewood, DMA 2003).
The CAP-DA program determines risk of institutional care by requiring Medicaid-enrolled individuals to have a physician certify their status; no guidelines exist to help physicians in this effort. Physicians can recommend five basic levels of care-home care, SNF care, ICF care, domiciliary (rest home) care, or other care (not defined)-and in some instances can make decisions with the aid of a caseworker (DMA 1986 ).
The complexity of simultaneously balancing the risk-of-institutionalization requirement with the budget-neutrality provision leads to interesting incentives for the waiver administrators. The risk-of-institutionalization requirement for waiver enrollees means it is likely that the probability of enrollment in the waiver will be a function of increased severity of illness, since sicker individuals are more likely to require SNF or ICF services. However, the budget-neutrality requirement means that if severity is positively correlated with expenditures, less severely ill individuals will be more likely to be selected for the program, above the ''risk of institutionalization'' threshold. 
Methods
We use two-part models of costs common in the health economics literature (Duan et al. 1984) for each of our three dependent variables: total costs, nursing home costs (which include both SNF and ICF costs), and hospital inpatient costs. Total costs include inpatient, outpatient, nursing home, drug, and miscellaneous costs (including costs of the waiver program). We also control for nonrandom selection into the CAP-DA program by using instrumental variables estimation.
Two-Part Model
The potential arises for a selection problem with the CAP-DA program: whereas most Medicaidenrolled disabled adults had some Medicaid expenditures during the study period, many had Home and Community-Based Waivers no expenditures on nursing homes and inpatient facilities. We use two-part expenditure models to estimate costs.
EðCosts ij Þ ¼ PrðCosts ij . 0Þ 3 EðCosts ij j Costs ij . 0Þ:
The first term on the right-hand side is specified as a probit model that predicts the probability of having any costs. Since probit coefficients are difficult to interpret, the marginal effect, or slope, of each variable is calculated, and the mean marginal effect is presented in the tables. Differential effects are calculated for all binary variables and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals around each of the marginal or differential effects are generated from 1,000 bootstrap replications. The second part uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to predict the continuous amount of costs, conditional on having any; i indexes disabled adults while the j index refers to the three types of cost models estimated. Costs are specified as a function of the percentage of the year a person is enrolled in CAP-DA, severity of disability in the previous year, and demographics in the previous year:
Often cost or expenditure models are logged in the hopes of transforming the error to a normal distribution and reducing the effects of outliers. For the continuous measures of expenditures, total dollars in FY 2000, total nursing home dollars, and total inpatient dollars, we employed a test by Wooldridge (1994) to determine whether logged or linear models are appropriate. The results of these tests uniformly indicate that linear models are preferred to logged ones.
Nonrandom Selection into the CAP-DA Program
Because participation in CAP-DA is based in part on a disabled adult's expected need for medical care, we cannot consider CAP-DA participation, our policy variable of interest, to be exogenous to the costs of Medicaid care. Hence, we explore whether CAP-DA is endogenous in the cost models, and use instrumental variables estimation to control for simultaneity bias. We model selection into the CAP-DA program as follows:
where the i subscript signifies the individual; 2 signifies FY 2000 while 1 signifies FY 1999, the base year; and the c subscript signifies the county where the individual resides. The program participation variable, percent of year in CAP-DA, is treated as a continuous, albeit censored variable since it ranges from 0 to 1 in order to make use of information on less than full-year waiver participation. This also enables us to use continuous variable techniques, such as instrumental variables, to deal with the potential endogeneity arising from this variable. We control for severity and demographic characteristics at the individual level, as subsequently described. The instruments that we use are county-level variables that are expected to influence CAP-DA participation by affecting the home health care infrastructure or the marketing style of each county's CAP-DA program. First, we use the total number of home health agencies licensed in a person's county. If there is a strong home health infrastructure, a disabled adult may be more likely to enroll in CAP-DA, which covers these services. In a recent state-level analysis by Kitchener, Carillo, and Harrington (2004) , a larger supply of home health agencies was positively related to waiver participation, making it a good candidate as an instrument.
Second, we use additional identifying instruments that are expected to affect the marketing of the program in a county. The first is the percentage of days in which the county's waiver slots were filled during fiscal year 2000. This variable mechanically is the sum of the number of days each person in the population was on the waiver in the county over the entire year divided by the total number of waivers allocated to a county in that year multiplied by 366 (FY 2000 was a leap year). This variable may reflect the diversity of strategies each county has in filling its waiver slots. The sign of this coefficient is assumed to be negative, since individuals residing in counties at full capacity may have a lower likelihood of en-rollment because the program is full or has a waiting list. However, we are at risk of violating the monotonicity assumption required of instrumental variables (Harris and Remler 1998) if individuals residing in counties near full capacity are in fact more likely to enroll in CAP-DA, perhaps due to a more aggressive marketing strategy or a more efficient outreach program compared to a county with a low-capacity value. In addition, we use dummy variables for the type of lead agency operating the waiver program in a person's county of residence (DMA 2002) . The type of agency also may reflect differences in how the program is marketed to individuals, given that some are closely linked with referral services such as a hospital, while others may be in a senior center. The dummy variables that we explore are: lead agency is a hospital, lead agency is a health department, lead agency is an agency on aging or senior center, and lead agency is a local office for state social services (reference category).
We do not expect any of these variables to directly influence the costs of Medicaid care, which is why they are good candidates to be instruments. The following section shows our test of the appropriateness of the instruments.
Severity Adjustment
Adjusting for severity is imperative to control for the differences in costs among individuals that are due to differences in medical need rather than participation in the CAP-DA program. It is difficult to assess severity using diagnostic codes in claims data because claims data contain coding errors (Iezzoni 2002) , and the prevailing condition driving medical care utilization may not be listed on the claim. For example, if a person with quadriplegia is seen for pneumonia, pneumonia would be coded on a medical claims form rather than a central nervous system problem, which may be a stronger driver of a person's demand for care. In addition, administrative databases do not link information about health conditions with data about performance of daily activities, participation in life situations, and social and physical environmental barriers (Iezzoni 2002) . Furthermore, administrative data alone reveal nothing about whether people view themselves as disabled (Iezzoni 2002) .
We use the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS) severity scale, which Kro-nick et al. (2000) developed to help make health-based capitated payments for disabled beneficiaries of Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 1 We chose the CDPS severity scale because, using analysis of Medicaid claims from six states, Kronick et al. (2000) showed that for disabled adults on Medicaid, the CDPS model is more predictive of future health care needs than both the diagnostic cost group/hierarchical condition category (DCG/HCG) model and the pharmaceutical reimbursement model. The purpose of using the CDPS here was not for risk adjustment. North Carolina does not make health-based capitated payments for Medicaid. Rather, we used the CDPS to control for the severity of the disabled adults in our sample so as to identify the disabled adults who were truly at risk of institutionalization (recall Figure 1 ).
In summary, this adjuster first identified 19 disease states, then identified the severity level within each of these disease states. This allowed us to attempt to capture the hypothesized higher probability of enrollment from the middle level of severity, as demonstrated in Figure 1 .
Data
The data came from five sources. We generated individual cost, utilization, severity, and demographic information from North Carolina Medicaid claims and enrollment files from FY 1999 and FY 2000 (July 1, 1998 , through June 30, 2000 . Data from FY 1999 served as our base year and were used to define the CDPS severity adjustment variables; data from FY2000 were used to estimate spending and served as the measure of CAP-DA participation. We merged these data with county-level health care supply, demographic, and economic characteristics found in the Area Resource File for North Carolina (DHHS 2001) . In addition, we used county-level information from the North Carolina Division of Facilities Services licensure files (DFS 2002) to ascertain how many licensed home health care agencies and nursing homes there were in every county in the state. Finally, we matched the countylevel data with data on the number of CAP-DA waiver slots approved by a county and the number of waiver slots used by a county in FY 2000. The allocation data were provided by the state of North Carolina. The data on type of lead agency in each county came from a published Medicaid bulletin (DMA 2002) .
Sample
To be selected for the sample, a Medicaid recipient had to be age 18 or older, qualify for Medicaid through the Medicaid Aid to the Blind or Disabled programs, and had to be continuously enrolled in Medicaid for the two-year study period. Because North Carolina grants eligibility to Medicaid in one-year increments, the requirement that people be continuously enrolled aids in making comparisons but is not overly restrictive. Because of the unusually long eligibility period that North Carolina grants Medicaid enrollees (usually one year) and the long-term disabilities in this population, we lost less than onehalf (46%) of the sample and just over one-quarter of the CAP-DA participants (27%) with this additional restriction. The continuously enrolled sample has fewer males, is slightly younger, and more likely to be blind than the sample lost due to noncontinuous enrollment. This restriction is necessary since we used the first year of data to develop diagnostic categories and the second year to monitor utilization. Preliminary analysis using a smaller diagnostic period of six months led to a considerable undercount of diagnostic conditions and therefore the longer one-year diagnostic period was preferred.
Recalling that the process of deeming a person at risk of institutionalization is highly subjective and that we cannot identify disabled adults truly at risk of institutionalization, we further limited our sample to high medical care users, defined as having Medicaid expenditures in the base year (FY 1999) of $10,000 or greater. Most CAP recipients had three times this level of expenditures in FY 1999 and even nonparticipants averaged $9,500 in total Medicaid costs, so this is a conservative threshold to meet. To provide additional context, the level of services needed to meet this threshold would be 88 days of full-time home health aide care (level II or III) or 88 days of institutional respite care (DMA 2004) . Given that average prescription drug costs were around $2,000 for the full sample in FY 1999 and that inpatient care was $4,600, it would take many fewer days than those expressed previously to meet the $10,000 threshold.
Originally, there were 116,378 disabled adults in the data set. After excluding people with less than $10,000 in Medicaid expenditures in FY 1999, we had 28,618 adults in our sample. In addition, one of the state's 100 counties relies primarily on capitated payments to managed care providers so no utilization data were available for this county. This excluded 1,562 individuals, so the final sample size was 27,056 individuals. Although disabled adults may be simultaneously enrolled in the Medicare program before age 65 (and virtually all have Medicare coverage at age 65), we still retained their Medicaid expenditures in our data. A significant proportion of the sample, 73%, was simultaneously enrolled in Medicare during our study period, including 80% of people enrolled in the CAP-DA program. A large proportion of their total health care costs was costs to Medicare, the primary payer, while Medicaid paid some or all of the remaining expenses. Our interest was in capturing the full set of Medicaid expenditures regardless of other insurance status and we were limited to using data that reflects expenditures by the Medicaid program only. Currently we simply control for Medicare status on Medicaid expenditures since dual eligibles will bill first to Medicare. 2 We did not condition the sample on ''risk of institutionalization'' because it was not clear a priori how to define people at risk given the subjective criteria used by the state. Because the people were disabled and used some Medicaid services in the past year, all had some underlying risk of institutionalization. To be deemed ''at risk'' simply requires a doctor's signature. Ideally, we would examine those people whose risk level lay above a certain threshold like the one in Figure 1 . Instead, we required that a person have high expenditures ($10,000 or above in FY 1999). We maintained broad selection criteria in order to make inferences about the effect of CAP-DA on total Medicaid expenditures for disabled adults. We controlled for a person's risk of institutionalization using the CDPS scale, which incorporates an extensive list of severity measures using diagnoses given in FY 1999.
Variables
Dependent variables. Most disabled adults in the sample had positive expenditures in FY 2000, which was to be expected given that we conditioned selection on high expenditures in the pre-Inquiry/Volume 42, Spring 2005 vious year. However, there was substantial variation by expenditure category (see Table 1 ). Of the full sample, 91% had positive expenditures of some type in FY 2000; 24% had some inpatient expenditures, and 26% had some nursing home expenditures in FY 2000. There were differences in costs by CAP-DA participation status. As might be expected, nearly every CAP-DA participant had some expenditures in FY 2000 (99.8%), but average total ex-penditures for CAP-DA participants were similar to those for nonparticipants. Incidence of nursing home use differed strongly by CAP-DA status (28% for nonparticipants vs. 6% for CAP-DA participants); in line with that, average nursing home expenditures for CAP-DA participants were less than one-fifth the expenditure level for nonparticipants. Inpatient utilization and costs showed smaller differences (see Table 1 ).
Endogenous variable. Just over 6% of the sam- Table 1 ). Of these, 76% participated in CAP-DA for the full year. Of the remaining 24%, enrollment was distributed approximately normally throughout the year-half were on the waiver for one to six months while half were on for seven to 11 months. The average time spent on CAP-DA was just over 10 months. Severity and demographics. The severity measure, the CDPS, was built on 19 diagnosis categories. These were broken down further by severity level (as measured by expected expenditure level) within each category, for a total of 56 severity categories (see Table 2 ). If a person had two different severity levels within one of the 19 main CDPS diagnosis categories, the CDPS program assigned them to the higher-cost condition. For example, if a disabled adult had congestive heart failure, a medium-cost cardiovascular condition, and hypertension, an extra low-cost cardiovascular condition, the person would have a code of ''1'' only for the medium-cost condition-congestive heart failure. The 19 diagnosis categories are not mutually exclusive, and the average person in the sample was coded into 3.6 of them. It was most common to fall into two or three diagnostic categories (15% each) while 12.1% did not fall into any diagnosis category. In coding the CDPS diagnosis category, we made use of all nine diagnoses potentially listed on a person's North Carolina FY 1999 Medicaid claims, rather than arbitrarily specifying only the primary or secondary diagnoses. Most disabled adults in the sample had low-or extra low-cost severity conditions, as Table 2 shows. Since categories were not mutually exclusive across diagnoses, the reference category for each of the 19 diagnosis categories was people without any mention of that condition.
There were significant statistical differences in severity between CAP-DA participants and non-CAP-DA participants for nearly every category. Most striking is that almost 40% of CAP-DA participants had low-cost nervous system problems (which includes epilepsy, Parkinson's disease, cerebral palsy, migraine and cerebral degeneration), while only 31% of non-CAP-DA participants did (Table 2) . While the relative difference in incidence of low-cost nervous system problems between the two groups was significant, low-cost nervous system problems and low-cost psychiatric problems (depression, panic disorder, phobic disorder) were the most common conditions for non-CAP-DA participants. For CAP-DA participants, after low-cost nervous system problems, low-cost pulmonary problems (viral pneumonia, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder [COPD], emphysema, and chronic bronchitis), medium-cost renal problems (acute renal failure, chronic nephritis, urinary incontinence, cystostomy or urinostomy), and low-cost gastrointestinal (GI) problems (ulcer, hernia, GI hemorrhage, intestinal infectious disease, or intestinal obstruc-tion) were the most common conditions. Extra high-and very high-cost hematological conditions were collapsed into one category due to lack of variation in the extra high category.
In addition, CAP-DA users had a much higher number of severity categories, averaging nearly five diagnoses compared to 3.5 for nonparticipants (Table 2 ). And while it was not uncommon for nonparticipants to have no CDPS diagnoses (12%), less than 1% of CAP-DA participants had zero diagnoses.
There was a limited amount of demographic information in the Medicaid claims (Table 1) . A typical disabled adult in the sample was female, white, 44 years old, and simultaneously enrolled in Medicare, although only about 1% of our sample was age 65 or over. Differences existed by CAP-DA participation. Relatively fewer African Americans participated in CAP-DA than whites and other nonwhites.
Specification Tests of Instrumental Variables and Functional Form
The validity of instrumental variables estimation relies on the strength of the instruments (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995) and the outcomes of several specification tests. The county variables we explore-number of home health agencies, CAP-DA capacity, and types of lead agencieswere jointly strong in the first-stage regression (F(5, 26989) ¼ 33.91). Total home health agencies also was strong on its own ( p , .001), as was CAP-DA capacity ( p , .001) and lead agency is a hospital ( p , .05). Because the three agency ownership types comprise one construct, we include all three in the models even though two categories were not statistically significant.
We test for endogeneity using a modified Wu-Hausman test, where we regress costs on the residuals from the first stage as well as the CAP-DA variable and other regressors. A significant residual term at the 5% level indicates endogeneity. We detect endogeneity for total and nursing home cost types; interestingly we find no evidence of the endogeneity of CAP-DA participation in the discrete portion of the nursing home model and in neither part of the inpatient model (see Table 3 ).
Next we test the validity of excluding the capacity variable from the main cost equations. The overidentification test entails regressing costs on all variables including capacity. A joint F test shows that it is valid to include the capacity variable and the lead agency dummy variables as instruments in the continuous total cost model, the total nursing home cost model and the inpatient cost model (Table 3) . Hence, in models besides these we use total home health agencies in a county as the identifying instrument.
Results
Controlling for nonrandom selection into the CAP-DA program is essential for the cost models, since CAP-DA participation is identified as being endogenous in many cases. Our preferred modeling approaches are summarized in the far right column of Table 3 . We focus on the instru- mental variables results in the text when endogeneity is detected, although the results tables (see Tables 4, 5, and 6) present outcomes from treating CAP-DA participation as exogenous as well.
To summarize the findings, CAP-DA participation led to a higher likelihood of having any costs, but among those with some costs, no difference was detected in the level of costs. For nursing home care, CAP-DA participants showed no difference in the likelihood of any nursing home expenditures, but among nursing home users, had much lower expenditures. CAP-DA participants were no less likely than nonparticipants to have any inpatient expenditures, but among inpatient users, CAP-DA participants had significantly lower levels of expenditures. We discuss each of these results in more detail, and provide predictions for three representative disabled adults: one with high-cost health conditions, one with medium-cost health conditions, and one with low-cost health conditions.
Total Costs
CAP-DA participants were significantly more likely to have some Medicaid expenditures than nonparticipants (Table 4) , although both had a high likelihood. We did not find evidence of endogeneity of selection in the first part of the total cost model (Table 3) , and in fact the instrumental variables probit model (Newey 1987 ; program written by J. Harkness, Johns Hopkins University; results not reported) estimate is quite similar to the simple probit model estimate. Among disabled adults with some expenditures, CAP-DA participation was associated with a lower amount of Medicaid costs, but this difference was only statistically significant at the 10% level once we controlled for the endogenous CAP-DA selection through the use of instrumental variables. Given the large sample size, we established 5% as our significance level. We provide estimates from both the exactly and overidentified second-part models in Table 4 for comparison purposes; the overidentification tests indicated that it was valid to include both instruments, yet the magnitudes of the coefficients differed greatly depending on which set of instruments were used. We developed predictions of the expected total cost savings for nine individuals with different demographic characteristics and different disease profiles, as defined by the CDPS diagnostic categories (Table 7) . For the predictions on total costs, we used the probit and the overidentified IV model. For a low-cost 44.2-year-old female, without a diagnosis in any of the CDPS categories, the cost savings of enrollment in CAP-DA would be less than $3,600 per year. These savings are somewhat lower for the other individuals in the table. These savings increase the higher the individual's predicted costs; for the medium-and high-cost people in the first panel of the table, we find savings of just over $5,000 and $7,000, respectively. None of the predicted total cost savings was statistically significant, which is consistent with the results reported earlier.
Among users, we detect no difference in cost by gender, but all racial groups had lower total costs than did whites (Table 4 ). Each additional year of age led to a $148 increase in annual total costs for service users. In addition, Medicare enrollees had about $860 less in Medicaid expenditures on average than did nonenrollees. Many of the severity conditions increased the total costs of care (these are discussed in more detail for nursing home and inpatient expenditures later).
The differences in the CAP-DA effect by the simple OLS model and the IV model demonstrate how critical the determination of endogeneity is to the results. A sweeping assumption of the exogeneity of CAP-DA participation would lead to the conclusion that the home and communitybased waiver program increases costs. Through the use of a separate equation to estimate the selection effect, we find that once the nonrandom selection into the program is controlled, we obtain a very different result.
Nursing Home Costs
We find no effect of CAP-DA on the probability of using nursing home services after appropriately controlling for selection into CAP-DA. Many of the severity conditions (results not shown) explained differences in rates of use and expenditures, adding exploratory power to the model. The severity conditions that had the largest increase in the risk of nursing home utilization were having a medium or low-cost developmental disability (b¼2.07, p , .001; b¼1.09, p , .001). In addition, having a high-cost central nervous system problem such as quadriplegia (b ¼ 1.14, p , .001), or a low-cost cerebrovascular condition (b ¼ .77, p , .001) increased the likelihood of nursing home use compared to the control group.
Males were more likely to use nursing homes than females, as were older individuals and people residing in more populated counties. Blacks and people of other races/ethnicities were less likely to use a nursing home than whites.
Recall that we did not find evidence of endogenous selection into CAP-DA for the level of nursing home expenditures; that is, there was a lack of evidence for unobserved factors that influence selection into CAP and also are correlated with nursing home expenditures. Hence, in the OLS results, we find a large, statistically significant effect of CAP-DA on nursing home expenditures for nursing home users. In the simulation discussed earlier, we found no nursing home cost savings for the two individuals with low or moderate severity of illness, but a statistically significant savings of between $18,000 and $22,000 from the reduction of nursing home costs for the more severely ill individuals in Table 7 .
In addition, age increased expenditures for nursing home users, while other nonwhite status decreased expenditures; not surprisingly, people enrolled in Medicare during the fiscal year had lower Medicaid expenditures ( Table 5 ). Many of the same severity indicators (not shown) increased nursing home expenditures as in the discrete nursing home expenditure model. 
Inpatient Costs
CAP-DA participants had no difference in the likelihood of inpatient use than nonparticipants, but inpatient costs were slightly lower among inpatient users. Here we highlight the probit and OLS results rather than instrumental variables versions of the models because we did not find evidence of endogenous selection. Inpatient costs were predicted to drop by approximately $160 to $500 per enrollee, for the characteristics and conditions used in our simulation ( Table 7) . The savings did not vary much by type of individual, due in part to the negligible effect that CAP-DA enrollment seemed to have on the probability of hospital use, but all predictions were statistically significantly different from zero. Interestingly, the largest cost savings were from the medium, not high, severity individuals, which is consistent with our description of Figure 1 , which predicts that the waiver administrators may avoid accepting individuals expected to be high cost.
The savings again are a result of lower expenditures for hospital users and not from a decreased probability of using hospital services. Males and those residing in a more populated county had a lower likelihood of inpatient care; only older people and those on Medicare were predicted to have lower costs among inpatient users.
In addition, many of the severity indicators led to increased likelihoods of inpatient care; such as extra high-cost and high-cost hematological problems (b ¼ 1. 51, p , .001), an incomplete pregnancy (b ¼.67, p , .001 ), and low-cost substance abuse problems (b ¼ .55, p , .001); medium-cost developmental disabilities seemed to have a protective effect against hospital inpatient use (b ¼À.51, p , .001).
Selection into CAP-DA
An artifact of the first-stage instrumental variables estimation of CAP-DA participation is how individuals' diagnosis categories predict the length of enrollment in the CAP-DA program. By examining the results from the severity levels within diagnostic categories, we can explore whether CAP-DA enrollment fits the pattern hypothesized by Figure 1 -that moderately ill individuals are more likely to be selected for enrollment into CAP-DA than non-ill individuals, and that more severely ill individuals are less likely to be selected for CAP-DA enrollment than moderately ill individuals. Since severity catego-ries within each diagnosis category are mutually exclusive, if Figure 1 actually describes the selection process within each severity category, we would expect to see two types of results in each category: 1) positive and statistically significant coefficients from the lowest level of severity, and 2) coefficients from increasingly higher levels of severity that were lower in magnitude than the coefficients from lower categories. We found some evidence of this type of selection pattern in 10 of the 16 categories with definitive information (results not reported). This does not seem to provide strong evidence that within each disability category, the least severely ill have a greater likelihood of CAP-DA enrollment, although clearly it does not rule out the Figure 1 hypothesis. The case may be that rankings are done across categories, such as preferring individuals with medium levels of renal conditions over people with low levels of substance abuse due to expected spending differences that stem from these conditions.
In addition to severity, Medicare status is positively associated with CAP-DA participation, so Medicare may be additionally controlling for severity and risk of institutionalization since individuals can qualify for Medicare by virtue of their disabled status if under age 65. Besides marking severity, the state may prefer enrolling Medicare enrollees in CAP-DA because they may be more likely to meet the budget neutrality rule of the waiver since Medicare pays for a portion of their costs that Medicaid otherwise would have picked up. While we cannot discern exactly what drives the significance of the Medicare control in the selection model, we are confident that it is an important control to include in the CAP-DA selection model.
Discussion and Policy Implications
The home and community-based waiver program examined here was not associated with decreased Medicaid expenditures for the care of disabled adults. The provision of supplemental services not ordinarily covered by the Medicaid program slightly increased the probability of having some expenses during the study year, due to the cost of the extra services provided, but resulted in no overall cost savings once differences in health conditions were controlled for.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the program seemed to generate substantial savings by reducing nursing home expenditures. We found that while waiver enrollment did not decrease the likelihood of using nursing home services, it did decrease the total amount spent for people with some nursing home access. This may be because the availability of substitute community-based services allowed people on the waiver to be released earlier once admitted to a nursing home. There may also have been a difference in the intensity of nursing home services provided, thus explaining the cost difference.
A reasonable amount of savings occurred for hospital users. Participation in the waiver program decreased the costs for hospital users, although it did not alter the probability of any hospital use. This seems to imply that many of the services provided under the CAP-DA program may shorten the length of time in the hospital or the intensity of hospital use. This finding may have implications for the budget neutrality calculation conducted by states to justify waiver use. If savings from the waiver occurred not only from nursing home expenditures but also from reduced expenses for hospital users, a broader definition of the expected cost of institutional care should be considered.
While at first it seems counterintuitive that waiver participation did not reduce total costs even though it significantly decreased both levels of nursing and inpatient costs, we found that waiver participants also had a higher likelihood of any drug and outpatient costs (results not reported), in part due to the expense of waiver services.
The effect of controlling for the differences in severity between CAP-DA enrollees and nonenrolled disabled adults cannot be understated. Had we assumed that waiver participation is exogenously determined, we would have come to very different conclusions about the effect of the CAP-DA program, in particular for the total costs and nursing home cost models. We did find considerable evidence of selection by severity of illness, although the support for the hypothesis of substantial selection of those with moderate, rather than severe, conditions within each diagnostic category was not consistent. However, we did not examine the selection of individuals of moderate severity across diagnostic categories (rather than within the categories), which may be another method of achieving the requirement of budget neutrality.
It is important to point out that our conclusions hinged on the strength of our identifying instruments for the models on total cost and any nursing home cost, where we controlled for selection into the waiver using instrumental variables estimation. There may be some concern that our identification was weak, at least for the nursing home cost model, because the system was identified exactly rather than over-identified. In addition, as in any instrumental variables analysis, the IV results hinged on the assumption that home health care supply, our exact identifying instrument, was appropriately excluded from the second stage. However, the specification tests showed that the instruments were individually and jointly strong in predicting waiver selection, although additional instruments could improve the efficiency of the instrumented waiver participation estimate.
Although we cannot generalize outside the sample of North Carolina Medicaid waiver participants, the home and community-based waiver program in this state achieved its goal of providing cost-neutral care in the community. This finding should be interpreted as a sign of success. Whereas total Medicaid cost savings were not found, perhaps due in part to the more acutely ill population selected for this analysis, savings were seen in both the nursing home and inpatient sector for people who accessed these two service types. This analysis did not capture the benefit to disabled adults of remaining in the community but it likely is positive assuming a strong preference by most disabled individuals for living in the community.
The waiver helps meet recent legal mandates from the Olmstead decision that disabled adults be granted more community-based care options. Further analyses clearly are warranted using other states' experiences. In addition, analyses examining cost shifting to other sectors, such as family caregivers, for individuals placed in the community, as well as analyses examining Medicare and Medicaid expenditures should be conducted for a complete economic evaluation of home and community-based waiver programs.
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1 Many research projects rely on insurance claims; researchers have built comorbidity indices using claims data. Some indices use a small number of di-agnoses (Charlson et al. 1987; Elixhauser et al. 1998) to categorize severity for specific subpopulations. Other severity measures are used to help guide reimbursement policies. For example, the Diagnostic Cost Group Hierarchical Condition Category payment model (DCG/HCC) (Ash et al. 2000) and the CDPS (Kronick et al. 2000) cover a much larger list of diagnostic conditions. Similarly, researchers have used pharmaceutical claims data to categorize severity (Gilmer et al. 2001 ).
